Introduction
The debate between free will and determinism has been a controversial issue of philosophy. Despite the fact that many people believe in human free will, there is no definite way to prove its existence. Along with the 연구논문 human mental events can be regarded as material events in the brain, they should also follow physical laws, and eventually, our mental process will be determined by precedent physical conditions of the brain and physical laws (Physical Determinism). However, in the 20 th century, this Newtonian way of thinking has changed due to the arrival on the scene of Quantum Mechanics. In 1927, Werner Heisenberg discovered the Uncertainty Principle: It is impossible to simultaneously know the exact position and momentum of an object, especially in the microscopic world. We can only know the probability distributions of the position and momentum of an object. This is not because of the poor ability of measurement tools, but because nature has this feature in itself. As Newtonian Physics led philosophers to physical determinism, Quantum
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed., Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5. Mechanics opened the path to indeterminism for philosophers. If our mental processes in the brain take place on the micro level to which quantum indeterminism is applied, it seems that the threat of physical determinism to free will is banished. However, quantum indeterminism has raised another problem with regard to free-will theory.
According to free-will theory, precedent conditions must not determine an event to such a degree as to leave an opportunity for self-determination.
However, if the decision is not made by anything that precedes the event and the self-determination is subject to quantum indeterminism, the result of a decision will be the matter of random chance. For instance, in the above example of going to the restaurant for the dinner with a friend, the self decides to exclude 'walking' from the three options because of the rain.
However, it is possible that the self decides not to exclude 'walking' despite the rain outside. Although the precedent condition, namely the rain, gives more probability for the exclusion of walking, the self can decide not to exclude 'walking' because of its free will. However, if this self-decision follows quantum indeterminism as stated above, there is no reason that self comes to the particular result of a decision. Rather, the self-decision is simply a matter of randomly choosing between two options, namely to exclude or not, according to the probability distribution. Therefore, whether the event happens or not becomes a matter of pure chance. 3)
Problems in Free-Will Theory
For further understanding of the problems of free will, let us examine a premise underlying both free will and determinism. determinism and free-will debates, we find a common premise in both theories.
It is causality that represents a relationship between two events: a subsequent event (an effect) is the consequence of antecedent events (causes). Determinism explains this relationship between cause and effect. However, determinism goes beyond mere causality. It asserts that an event necessarily occurs without exception when there are sufficient antecedent causal conditions correlated with that event. For its part, free-will theory also presupposes causality. However, in this view, the cause is the self who exercises free will. Although scholars who assert free will do not explicitly address the relationship between free will and a resultant event, it seems that their view also depends on the bondage between free will and the event. Therefore, whether determinism becomes a threat to free will or not lies on the causes at work in a particular event.
There are various types of conditions, which determinists consider as causal conditions, such as foreordaining acts of God or simply antecedent physical causes. In this paper, however, I will not explore supernatural conditions such as divine providence, not because supernatural conditions cannot be properly considered as causal conditions, but because many determinists have a strong faith that natural events can be explained purely by physics, without a resort to non-physical possibilities. They assert that physical conditions and laws are sufficient as causal conditions (Physical Determinism). Therefore, I will consider here only physical causes and laws as causal conditions for determinism, and I use a simple definition of 'physical' as not sui generis mental. 4) In terms of this definition, physical determinism will deny free will as a physical cause. That is, in its strongest sense, physical determinism asserts that the only efficacious causes are physical ones, and there will be no room for mental causes such as the volition of free will acting in a decision process. Quantum Mechanics, this deterministic feature of classical physics is still suitable to explain events in the macroscopic world. How can it be applied to our mental events? What is the reason that allows us to think of our mental events in terms of this deterministic feature of physics? The key reason is that mental events such as the decision process are closely correlated with the human brain, which is composed of matter. If mental events take place on the level to which Quantum Mechanics cannot be applied, they can thus be thought to follow the deterministic mode of the movements of physical objects. Therefore, free will cannot be regarded as a source of an event.
What does happen if mental events take place on the quantum level and quantum indeterminism can thus be applied to our mental processes? Is free-will theory then possible? Even if this is the case, there is yet another problem: the matter of chance. In contrast to determinists, libertarianists, who assert the existence of free will, insist that the self makes a choice on its own at the decisive stage, even though there exist antecedent conditions. In the libertarian free-will theory, the self acts in the decision process as a causal condition unaffected by any other antecedent condition. However, the problem of libertarianism is that the mental processes of the self are correlated with the human brain, in which the movements of neurons follow the indeterminism of quantum mechanics on the micro level. This means that the decision is made by chance: the random decision of one among various physical sets. As long as mental events are subject to such material events in the brain, there is no free will that can serve as the ultimate source of an event.
Challenged as it is by both physical determinism and quantum indeterminism, it seems that free-will theory is problematic. Let us trace back how each physical theory challenges the free-will theory and what premise or feature each physical theory has. At first, there seems no room for free will in physical determinism because by definition it only acknowledges precedent physical conditions and excludes free will as a source of an event. Quantum indeterminism seems to allow for free will to interrupt a causal chain in the decision process; but it leaves the problem of randomness.
As a noteworthy premise in both physical determinism and quantum indeterminism, both theories regard mental events as neural processes in the brain, namely material events. If they have this premise, they must have following premises as well: (1) the premise of materialism that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, (2) the causal closure of physics that only physical conditions can give rise to physical events, (3) the premise of reductionism that mental phenomena are reducible to material phenomena. To determine the adequacy of free will-theory, we need to examine if these three premises of physical determinism and quantum indeterminism have problems.
If they have, the challenges to the free-will theory will not be insurmountable.
A Problem with Physical Determinism
According to causality, any event e' (or its probability of occurrence in Quantum Mechanics) at time t2 occurs as the result of an antecedent event e at time t1. Causality does not necessarily imply determinism. In the case of Quantum Mechanics, there is the possibility that event e' may not occur as a result of antecedent event e. Let us schematize causality as follows:
What presuppositions are involved in the acceptance of causality? First of all, in causality we distinguish a prior event from a subsequent one.
Secondly, we must recognize a distinction in the direction of time, namely from time t1 to t2. In accepting causality, we necessarily presuppose this direction of time.
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Physical determinists assert that all physical events are fully determined by physical causes and laws. This assertion is based on the causal closure of physics that every physical event has sufficient physical causes. 5) According to physical determinism, therefore, event e is a sufficient physical cause and the progress from an event e to e' is determined by physical laws. Because physical determinism has its basis on causality, it should be consistent with the presupposition of causality, namely the direction of time.
In order to understand how physical causes and laws determine the physical effects, let us consider the example of a collision of two physical objects. If the mass and velocity of each physical object are known, the movements of the two objects after collision can be determined by laws of conservation, which are the conservation laws of momentum and energy. 6) That is, the mass and velocity of each object are physical sufficient causes, and the effect of the collision is fully determined by the laws of conservation.
Let us closely examine these laws. According to Noether's theorem, each law of conservation in physics directly corresponds to a differential symmetry of a physical system. 7) For example, the conservation of momentum is based on spatial symmetry, and that of energy on time symmetry. What we need to give particular attention to is time symmetry, for causality is about time. There are three types of time symmetry: time-translation invariance, time-reversal invariance, and time-scale invariance. Among these three symmetries, time-reversal invariance presents a problem to causality. Time-reversal symmetry 5) D. Papineau, "The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism", 53. 6) In physics, the conservation law states that the quantity of an isolated system does not change as the system evolves. For example, momentum, energy and electric charge, etc. are all conserved quantities in an isolated system. These conserved quantities have an important role in physics because changes in other quantities are determined on the basis of these conserved quantities. 7) Hans Primas, "Hidden Determinism, Probability, and 
A Problem with Materialism and the Causal Closure of Physics
In materialism, matter is the fundamental substance of reality, and all events, including mental events, can be explained in terms of material movement. However, there is a problem with materialism that springs from the limitation of human perception. Let us suppose that a man has grown up since birth in the virtual reality of a super computer, and that all his sense organs are attuned to this virtual reality. Because his sensations are confined to the virtual world of the computer, with no experience of the world beyond the virtual reality, he will consider a pixel or dot in the virtual world as a fundamental substance, and he will regard the computer programmed rules in the virtual reality as the natural laws of his world. Moreover, he thinks that his virtual avatar, which represents him in the virtual world, is himself. In such a situation, can we say that the pixel in the virtual world is, indeed, a fundamental substance? Can we say that there is no rule except the programmed rules in the computer system and that there exists no unprogrammed interruptions of the self that can affect the virtual reality in which it exists? Is his avatar the real self?
This example calls attention to important aspects of the materialistic perspective on our world. First of all, there is no guarantee that matter is the fundamental substance of reality as long as human perception is limited to five sense organs. Secondly, physical laws may not be the only laws that affect our reality. Some philosophers, in line with the strong causal closure of physics, maintain that no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain. 9) However, there is a possibility that entities outside the physical domain actually can affect physical reality, as in the above example of the possibility of unprogrammed interruptions of the self that can affect its virtual reality. Therefore, we cannot assert materialism and the causal closure of physics. Rather, it may be possible to regard matter as simply a tool for expressing broader laws regarding the self and physical laws.
A Problem with Physical Reductionism
It is common to explain our mental events as neural processes in the brain. This approach has advantages because it provides definite, objective conditions for research. However, some philosophers expand this approach and consider our mental events as nothing but these neural processes. They thus reduce our mind to brain activities (Reductionism and fundamental character of the pain. 10) Thomas Nagel has pointed out that "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view." 11) How I feel the pain of the mosquito's bite is only for me to know; no one can access this subjective character of the pain. This subjective, first person character of the self cannot be reduced to the objective physical event.
A Suggestion of Expanded Domain Model for Free-Will Problems
Free-will theory presupposes the existence of the self, and in this presupposition, the understanding of free will has two features: (1) the autonomy of the self as the source of an event and (2) the availability of alternative possibilities in which it exerts itself as a source. An understanding of free will in terms of the following model can shed light on the problems that both physical determinism and quantum indeterminism present to free will. Physical determinism denies both of the above two features of free will.
In that theory, only antecedent physical conditions are sufficient causal 10) John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), 117. 11) Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat", in The Philosophical Review, 83/4(1974 October), 437. conditions; there is no room for free will to act as a source of an event.
Moreover, physical determinism does not allow alternative possibilities, because it regards every event as predetermined by antecedent physical conditions. In contrast to physical determinism, quantum indeterminism allows for the second feature of free will, namely the availability of alternative possibilities. However, it leaves unsolved the problem of randomness. In quantum indeterminism, self-determination amounts to nothing more than as if the self rolls a dice for every decision. Must we thus say that the autonomy of the self is nothing more than random activity?
Concerning the problem of randomness, John Searle says, "The indeterminacy at the micro level may explain the indeterminacy of the system level, but the randomness at the micro level does not by itself imply randomness at the system level." 12) The self-decision of free will can be regarded as randomness on the micro level of neurobiology, but not necessarily on the system level of human consciousness. This is the point where my suggestion of an expanded domain model for free-will problems starts.
As we saw in the example of virtual reality, there is a doubt about confining free will to the limits of materialism and the causal closure of physics. There is no definite reason to confine our mental events to the physical domain as long as human perception has an intrinsic subjective, first person character. While the mentality of the self remains unchanged regardless of the world in which the self exists, the representational tools of the self and laws change in line with the make-up of its world just as pixels in the virtual world or matter in the real world. It is plausible that mental events (mind) themselves are considered as more fundamental entities than material events (body), and it is thus possible to expand the domain that The expanded domain model can also give a chance to avoid the problem that arises from quantum indeterminism. In the above example of virtual reality, unprogrammed interruptions by the self that exists outside cannot be explained by the computer's pre-programmed rules. Likewise, the free will of the self that exists beyond the bound of the physical domain cannot be expressed by physical laws. For this reason, its activity appears as random one in the physical domain in line with the randomness of quantum indeterminism, but the expanded domain model makes the problem of randomness irrelevant.
Conclusion
Because of problems in free-will theory, philosophers such as compatabilists, who believe that free will and determinism are compatible, have insisted on changing the definition of free will. However, I have kept the definition of free will in which people generally believe, and examined doubts and problems that physical determinism and quantum indeterminism present to the free will. The premises of both those theories are materialism, the causal closure of physics, and reductionism. With the expanded domain model, I have attempted to justify two features of free will -autonomy and availability of possible alternatives. Nonetheless, though this model can provide a way to solve the problems of free will, it presently has its own difficulty: the postulated free will aspect of our mental domain lies beyond the physical domain and is accessible only by the self, which makes the mental domain difficult for objective study. Still, however, I believe that it will not remain a subjective area forever. As the fundamental substance of science has changed from the four elements of Empedocles to elementary particles in Quantum Mechanics, there will hopefully someday be a way to research the subjective area of our mental domain. The debate between free will and determinism has been a controversial issue of philosophy. Despite the fact that many people believe in human free will, there is no definite way to prove its existence. Along with the development of physics and neurobiology, the debate between these two theories has taken other aspects, which are different from traditional approaches. On one side, on the basis of Newtonian physics, some philosophers maintain that physical determinism dominates mental events in the brain; at the other side, other philosophers insist that free will can be possible because of quantum indeterminism. However, quantum indeterminism also presents a problem to free will: the matter of random chance.
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Because of problems in free-will theory, philosophers such as compatabilists, who believe that free will and determinism are compatible, have insisted on changing the definition of free will. In this article, however, I have kept the definition of free will in which people generally believe, and examined doubts and problems that physical determinism and quantum indeterminism present to the free will.
In this article, I suggest an expanded model to overcome the problems of free will, which is different from dualism. Traditionally, dualism gives rise Abstract
